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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102(3)(j) and under the Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court properly find that the State of Utah did not comply with Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6) by failing to plead sufficient facts in its Second 
Amended Complaint to survive a motion to dismiss the State's claims for: (a) restitution, costs 
and civil penalties under the Utah False Claims Act, Utah Code Ann. § 26-20-1 et seq.\ and (b) 
common law fraudulent misrepresentation. 
Standard of Review: The propriety of a motion to dismiss under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 9(b) is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Constitutional Provisions: N/A 
Statutes: Utah False Claims Act, Utah Code Ann. § 26-20-1 et seq. 
Rules: Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a); Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b); Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case involves claims under the Utah False Claims Act and for fraudulent 
misrepresentation for allegedly providing false pricing information for pharmaceuticals to non-
party industry reporting services which the State then allegedly relied upon when it reimbursed 
non-party providers for dispensing drugs to Medicaid beneficiaries. 
Course of Proceedings and the Disposition Below 
On May 8, 2008, the State filed this action against Morton Grove and others alleging 
fraud arising from the reimbursement for pharmaceuticals by the State Medicaid program. 
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According to the State, the Defendants' fraudulent reporting of Average Wholesale Price 
("AWP") to a non-party publisher and subsequent marketing of their prescription drugs caused 
the State Medicaid program to pay grossly excessive prices for prescription drugs to non-party 
pharmacies and physicians. (R. at 01-035.) The State set forth two claims for relief. The first 
claim for relief was for restitution, costs and civil penalties under the Utah False Claims Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-20-1 et seq. (R. at 017-018.) The second claim for relief was under the 
common law for fraudulent misrepresentation. (R. at 018-019.) 
Morton Grove filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) 
and 12(b)(6). (R. at 0395-0396.) The other Defendants also filed similar Motions to Dismiss. 
(R. at 0158-0161.) On February 13, 2009, consistent with courts in other jurisdictions addressing 
similar claims, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision (Rl 061-1073) in which it 
explained that Utah's "conclusory allegations fall short of satisfying Rule 9(b)." (R. at 1065.) 
The District Court noted that Utah "has failed to set forth even minimal facts in identifying the 
specific drugs manufactured or sold by each individual defendant for which they provided an 
allegedly fraudulent or false price. The broadly-worded, blanket allegations of fraud in the 
Amended Complaint against the defendants as a collective will not suffice under Rule 9(b)." (R. 
at 1065-1066.) 
Rather than dismissing the Amended Complaint, however, the District Court granted the 
State leave to amend and, again consistent with courts elsewhere, required the State to identify 
the following: 
• the specific drug at issue; 
• the specific defendant involved in that drug's sale or manufacture; 
• the allegedly false publication by a specific defendant of that specific drug's 
pricing, to whom the defendant made the publication and when; and 
• whether Utah actually used or relied on the allegedly false pricing information in 
setting reimbursement rates. The Court also explained that, to the extent possible, 
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Utah should identify the actual price that should have been published and the 
party purchasing the drug. (R. at 1066.) 
In addition, the District Court determined, with respect to Utah's claim under the False 
Claims Act, that the State should allege with specificity when (1) a defendant submitted claims 
to the State or directed others to submit claims; and (2) identify what benefit a defendant derived 
directly from the State, rather than from the purchase of a defendant's drugs by physicians and 
pharmacies. (R. at 1066-1067.) The District Court further explained that, due to the multiple 
ways the State determines reimbursement for generic product, an amended complaint should 
{inter alia) identify how allegedly false reporting of AWP for generic drugs by a specific 
defendant altered or influenced reimbursement paid to pharmacies or physicians for dispensing 
generic drugs to Medicaid beneficiaries. (R. at 1067.) 
On March 31, 2009, Utah filed its Second Amended Complaint which contained the same 
claims for relief as before (violation of the Utah False Claims Act and common law fraudulent 
misrepresentation) but utterly failed to meet the pleading standards set forth by the District 
Court. (R. at 1117-1185.) Morton Grove and the other Defendants filed renewed Motions to 
Dismiss, again pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6). See Memorandum 
Decision, Feb. 26, 2010 (R. at 2055-2070). The District Court granted Morton Grove's and the 
other Defendants' motions, specifically ruling that the case was subject to dismissal with 
prejudice under Rule 9(b) and Rule 12(b)(6) for much the same reasons set forth in its earlier 
decision. Id. 
The State appealed the District Court's decision. 
Statement of Facts 
This is an appeal of the District Court's decision on motions to dismiss the Second 
Amended Complaint. Therefore, Morton Grove must accept the facts contained in the Second 
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Amended Complaint as true for the purposes of this appeal. The State's statement of facts, 
however, insufficiently describes how the Medicaid program operates in Utah and improperly 
and inaccurately lumps all defendants together. 
How the State of Utah's Medicaid Plan Operates for Generic Drug Manufacturers 
All drugs sold by Morton Grove are generic or multiple source drugs. (R. at 1230.) Like 
most other states, the State limits reimbursement for generic and multiple source drugs to the 
lower of either the maximum allowable cost set by the State, for drugs not subject to a federal 
upper limit ("FUL"), the estimated acquisition cost, or the provider's usual and customary charge 
(billed charge) to the general public. See Utah State Medicaid Plan at Attachment 4.19-B 
("Methods and Standards for Establishing Payment Rates - Other Types of Care"), p. 19 (Pltf s 
Addendum at A0112). In addition, multiple source drug reimbursement rates, are limited, in the 
aggregate, by the FUL. See id. This FUL was, at the relevant times, 150% of the lowest 
reported public price by any manufacturer. See 42 C.F.R. 447.332(b). The State fails to provide 
any facts concerning how drug prices reported by Morton Grove affected any of these 
reimbursement benchmarks. 
In addition, the State does not cite to the record or other authority to support its 
proposition that "Medicaid has no way of collecting the wholesale pricing information on its 
own[.]" (Plaintiffs Brief at p. 6.) 
The State Improperly Lumps All Defendants Together 
In its Statement of Facts (and throughout its Brief), the State claims that all of the 
Defendants have been subject to similar lawsuits brought by other states' Medicaid agencies. 
See Plaintiffs Brief at p. 8 and passim. In support it cites to its Response to Morton Grove's and 
other Defendants' motions to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, where it claimed that "all 
Defendants filed briefs in their failed and improper removal attempt detailing the basis of this 
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action and requesting transfer to an MDL proceeding in Boston, in which over 50 pharmaceutical 
pricing cases are consolidated." (R. at 1498.) A simple review of the docket from the MDL 
proceeding demonstrates that Morton Grove was not a party to any of the consolidated litigations 
or the MDL proceedings, and therefore did not file or join such a brief. In addition, Morton 
Grove has (to the best of its knowledge) not been a defendant or otherwise a party to any other 
"wholesale price" litigation. The State does not cite to anything in the record supporting a 
contrary position. 
The State's Second Amended Complaint Lacks the Necessary Factual Allegations to Plead 
a Claim Under Utah's False Claims Act and for Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
Despite specific instructions by the District Court, the Second Amended Complaint filed 
by the State failed to plead the following: 
• the specific drug(s) at issue with respect to Morton Grove; 
• Morton Grove's involvement in that drug's sale or manufacture; 
• Morton Grove's allegedly false reporting of pricing for that drug, including to 
whom that publication was made, and when; 
• whether and how the State actually used or relied on the allegedly false pricing 
information provided by Morton Grove in setting reimbursement rates; 
• whether Morton Grove submitted claims to the State or directed others to submit 
claims, and if so, how and when; 
• the benefit Morton Grove derived directly from the State as a result of the alleged 
false reporting, rather than from the purchase of its drugs by physicians and 
pharmacies; 
• how allegedly false publications of AWP by Morton Grove altered or influenced 
the reimbursement for generic drugs; and 
• whether Morton Grove reported the lowest price which would have set the FUL 
or how Utah used any pricing information (be it AWP and/or other pricing 
information) provided by Morton Grove to set reimbursement. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The District Court properly found that the State failed to sufficiently plead its Second 
Amended Complaint under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The District Court found that the 
State failed to plead its causes of action with the particularity required by Rule 9(b). In addition, 
the State failed to properly plead the elements of its specific causes of action against Morton 
Grove. The State's argument that "nationwide litigation" involving similar claims - litigation to 
which Morton Grove is not a party - provides Morton Grove fair notice of the State's claims in 
Utah is not based in law or fact, and should be rejected. Therefore, this Court should affirm the 
District Court's decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court Properly Determined That Rule 9(b)'s Heightened Pleading 
Standards Apply To The State's Causes Of Action, 
A. Rule 9(b) Requires Claims Of Fraud To Be Plead With Particularity. 
Utah law requires that "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and 
other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally." Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). The State 
interprets Rule 9(b) to mean that "its allegations of fraud need only be stated with enough 
'particularity' to give Defendants notice of the claims against them" (Plaintiffs Brief at p. 14) 
and that "Rule 9(b) does not impose a higher standard of notice upon pleadings of fraud" (id at 
p. 15). This argument misstates years of Utah jurisprudence and, if accepted by this Court, 
would represent a significant departure from the longstanding requirements of pleading claims of 
fraud. 
Utah courts considering Rule 9(b) have explained that "the mere recitation by a plaintiff 
of the elements of fraud in a complaint does not satisfy the particularity requirement." Armed 
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Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 70 P.3d 35, 40 (Utah 2003). Instead, Rule 9(b) requires a 
complaint to recite the relevant surrounding facts with sufficient particularity to show what facts 
are claimed to constitute the fraud charges. Id. (citing Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 
966, 971 (Utah 1982). 
Armed Forces Ins. Exch. is instructive. In that decision, this Court noted that the 
plaintiffs claim for fraud failed even though plaintiff alleged that 
33. Defendants made false representations concerning present 
existing material facts, which representations they either knew to 
be false or were made recklessly, and defendants omitted material 
facts despite their duty fully to disclose, all for the purpose of 
inducing action on the part of plaintiff. 
34. Plaintiff actually and justifiably relied upon the false 
representations and material omissions to its injury and detriment, 
in an amount to be determined at trial. 
70 P.3d at 40. This Court found this form of pleading insufficient under Rule 9(b), explaining 
that "[t]hese paragraphs merely recite the elements of fraud, however, and, as we have already 
noted, such conclusory allegations alone fail to allege fraud with sufficient particularity." Id. 
(citation omitted). This is the type of pleading which the State claims is sufficient here. 
The decisions cited by the State either support this standard or are not applicable. For 
example, in Hill v. Allred, 28 P.3d 1271 (Utah 2001), this Court found that the plaintiff did plead 
fraud with particularity because the plaintiff actually "allegefd] specific facts,. . ., regarding her 
attempt to purchase a piece of real property with the help of several defendants in this action, the 
manner in which the transaction was initiated, and the unfolding of events related to her attempt 
to secure ownership of the property." Id. at 1275. And in Williams, supra, this Court considered 
whether an insurer's affirmative defense of misrepresentation (where the binge-drinking insured 
had stated that he had never been treated for excessive use of alcohol) was properly plead. 
There, this Court explained that "this affirmative defense recited a particular answer to a 
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question involving alcoholism, and specifically alleged that this answer was fraudulent or 
material to the acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed or that the defendant would not have 
issued the policy (at least not at that rate) i f the true facts had been made known . . . . '[.]" 656 
P.2d at 972. This Court further explained that "this allegation was sufficient and fair notice to 
put in issue all of the statutory defenses of deception, including the omission, incorrect 
statement, and misrepresentation ultimately found by the jury." Id. None of this occurred here. 
The other decisions cited by the State are completely inapplicable, as they do not involve 
fraud-pleading or Rule 9(b). Casaday v. Allstate Ins. Co,, 232 P.3d 1075 (Utah Ct. App. 2010) 
(underinsured motorist claim); Canfield v. Layton City, 122 P.3d 622 (Utah 2005) (wrongful 
termination claim). In short, the few cases cited by the State involving fraud support the 
proposition that it must plead its claims with specificity and particularity. 
Even the State has previously recognized that Rule 9(b) requires it to plead with 
particularity specific instances in which Morton Grove committed fraud: 
"Rule 9's requirement that Plaintiffs plead 'the circumstances 
constituting fraud' with particularity refers to matters such as the 
time, place, and contents of the false representations, as well as the 
identity of the person making the misrepresentations and what he 
obtained thereby."' Iadanza v. Mather, 820 F. Supp. 1371, 1383 
(D. Utah 1993) (citing, 5 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1297 at 590 (1990)). 
Plaintiffs Opposition to Morton Grove's Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint at 
p. 5. (R. at 1497.) 
As explained infra at Sections II.A.1-6, the State has failed to plead such necessary facts 
as: Morton Grove's allegedly false publication of a specific drug's pricing, to whom that 
publication was made and when; whether and how the State actually used or relied on the 
allegedly false pricing information allegedly provided by Morton Grove when setting 
reimbursement; whether Morton Grove submitted claims to the State or directed others to submit 
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claims; the benefit Morton Grove derived directly from the State, rather than from the purchase 
of its drugs by physicians and pharmacies; how allegedly false publications of AWPs for generic 
drugs altered or influenced reimbursement for generic drugs; and whether Morton Grove 
reported the lowest price which would have set the FUL. In fact, the Second Amended 
Complaint lacks any explanation of how Utah may have used any pricing information (be it 
AWP, Wholesale Acquisition Cost ("WAC") and/or other pricing information) provided by 
Morton Grove to set reimbursement. As recognized by the District Court, the State has failed to 
meet the burden set forth by Rule 9(b). 
B, Claims Under the Utah False Claims Act Are Subject to Rule 9(b)'s Pleading 
Requirements. 
The State seeks to rely upon a single out of State court decision, State ex rel Brady v. 
Publishers Clearing House, 787 A.2d 111 (Del Ch. 2001), to support its position that claims 
under the Utah False Claims Act do not need to comply with Rule 9(b). Plaintiffs Brief at p. 22. 
However, Brady is inapplicable. It did not involve a claim under the equivalent of Utah's False 
Claims Act. Brady, 787 A.2d at 112. Moreover, as one court considering the issue has 
explained: 
[EJvery circuit court that has addressed this issue has concluded that the heightened 
pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) apply to claims brought under the FC A. See Yuhasz 
v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559, 562-63 (6th Cir. 2003); United States ex rel 
Clausen v. Lab. Corp. of Am., Inc., 290 F.3d 1301, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2002), cert, 
denied, 537 U.S. 1105, 123 S.Ct. 870, 154 L.Ed.2d 774 (2003); United States ex rel 
Totten v. Bombardier Corp., 286 F.3d 542, 551-52 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Bly-Magee v. 
California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001); Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah 
River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783-84 (4th Cir. 1999); United States ex rel LaCorte v. 
SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs., Inc., 149 F.3d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 1998); United States 
ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 1997); 
Gold v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 68 F.3d 1475, 1476-77 (2d Cir. 1995); see also John T. 
Boese, Civil False Claims and Qui Tarn Actions § 5.04 (2d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2003 ("It is 
widely accepted by courts that because the essence of a False Claims Act is fraud, Rule 
9(b) applies to FCA cases.... The applicability of Rule 9(b) to qui tarn actions is by now 
beyond dispute."). For the reasons discussed above, we now join this consensus and hold 
that Rule 9(b) applies to claims under the FCA. 
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United States ex rel Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 228 (1st Cir. 2004). 
Accordingly, the District Court properly ruled that Rule 9(b) is applicable and the False Claims 
Act claims should be plead with particularity. 
II. The State's Second Amended Complaint Failed To Properly Plead The State's 
Causes of Action. 
When the State filed its Second Amended Complaint, not only did it fail to adhere to the 
pleading requirements that the District Court set forth in its decision dismissing the Amended 
Complaint, the State actually regressed in terms of the specificity provided. For example, the 
District Court explained that it was "not convinced that the State is unable to obtain essential 
information regarding the defendants' pricing methods[,]" noting that Utah had attached as an 
exhibit to its Amended Complaint "a list with 'a few representative examples' of the specific 
instances where the State believes prices were inflated" and that Utah stated it was "currently in 
the process of conducting a comprehensive analysis which it predicts will yield the essential 
information." (R. at .1065) Instead of conducting that analysis over the several months that 
elapsed between the ruling on the insufficiency of the Amended Complaint, the State removed 
all such information from the Second Amended Complaint. However, pleading the allegedly 
inflated prices by specific drug and manipulation of AWP by a manufacturer are essential 
components of the claim. See, In re Pharma. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 491 F. 
Supp. 2d 20 (D.Mass. 2007), affd, 582 F.3d 156 (1s t Cir. 2009). 
Most tellingly, the State abandoned most of its factual allegations that any of the 
Defendants engaged in "marketing of the spread" between reimbursement to pharmacies or 
physicians by the State and the cost paid by pharmacies or physicians to manufacturers or 
wholesalers for that drug product. The District Court, following the reasoning of other courts 
which have addressed AWP pricing cases, ordered the State to identify the specific defendant 
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allegedly engaging in marketing the spread, specifically how providers were induced to purchase 
the specific drug (i.e., provision of free goods, educational grants and other incentives), and the 
actual purchase price of the drug to the pharmacy and/or physician. (R. at 1066.) See In re 
Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig, 263 F. Supp. 2d 172, 194 (D. Mass. 2003) 
(holding that plaintiffs were required to clearly and concisely allege with respect to each 
defendant: (l)the specific drug or drugs that were purchased from defendant and (2) the 
allegedly fraudulent AWP for each drug). Other courts have required the same. See 
Commonwealth v. TAP Pharm. Prod, Inc., 868 A.2d 624, 635 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005); 
Massachusetts v. Mylan Labs, No. 03-11865-PBS (D. Mass. Apr. 5, 2005). Rather than 
bolstering its inadequate allegations that the Defendants engaged the "marketing of the spread," 
the State simply removed most of these references from its Second Amended Complaint. See In 
re Pharma. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 491 F. Supp. 2d at 102 (D. Mass. 2007) 
(specific instances of marketing the "spread" must be considered in making a determination as to 
whether unfair - not even fraudulent - conduct exists). See also OIG Compliance Program for 
Pharma. Mfr., 68 Fed. Reg. 23,731-01, 23, 737 (May 5, 2003) (examples of "marketing the 
spread"). 
Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed these claims against Morton Grove 
because the State failed to adequately plead its causes of action. Specifically, the Second 
Amended Complaint: 
• Did not provide the what, where, and when to the allegedly false publication of 
each drug's pricing; instead, it only made the vague and inadequate allegations 
that Morton Grove "made false publications for each drug" at issue and "set, 
controlled and reported prices for said drugs to third-party compendia, including 
First Databank." (Second Amended Complaint at \ 49); 
• Lacked allegations with respect to the State's claim under the Utah False Claims 
Act, that Morton Grove submitted claims to the State or directed others to submit 
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claims. Nor were any facts alleged regarding how, when, or where Morton Grove 
- as opposed to the Defendants in general - induced physicians and pharmacies to 
purchase, prescribe, or dispense Morton Grove drugs; and 
• Failed to allege that the State actually relied on the allegedly false pricing 
information submitted by Morton Grove - as opposed to the Generic Defendants 
in general - in setting reimbursement. 
The State's failure to meet the pleading threshold belies its representations to the District 
Court that it was "conducting a comprehensive analysis" which would allow it to plead the 
necessary information to state a cause of action, including the specific instances of allegedly 
inflated pricing, reliance, and benefit. (R. at 1065.) Therefore, dismissal with prejudice was 
proper. 
A. The State's Second Amended Complaint Fails To Plead Its Claims With 
Particularity Or To Even State A Claim As To Morton Grove, 
1. The State Failed To Plead Any Facts Specific to Morton Grove, 
The State never plead any facts specific to Morton Grove. Instead, as it admits in its 
Brief, it only makes general allegations as to "Defendants." See Pltf s Brief at pp. 20-21 
(discussing the State's allegations regarding its cause of action for common law fraudulent 
misrepresentation); id. at p 25 (discussing the State's allegations regarding its cause of action 
under the Utah False Claims Act). For example, the State claims that it "alleged facts showing 
that Defendants caused false statements and representations to be made in the form of inflated 
pricing reports" (id. at p. 25) and that it "alleged facts showing that Defendants willfully and 
knowingly induced pharmacies and other providers to buy more of their drugs to sell to Medicaid 
because the inflated prices created a higher profit margin for those drugs." Id. However, the 
State fails to identify in the Second Amended Complaint what Morton Grove, as opposed to the 
collective Defendants, allegedly did. For example: 
• None of the allegations allege that the State used pricing information supplied by 
Morton Grove to set the reimbursement rates in the State; 
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• None of the allegations suggest that Morton Grove marketed the spread; and 
• None of the allegations suggest any intent to deceive by Morton Grove. 
In short, the State has not pled any facts that would implicate Morton Grove as opposed to the 
general "Defendants." 
General allegations that Morton Grove may have violated the Utah False Claims Act 
and/or committed common law fraud do not meet the pleading requirements under Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a); Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). Given the dearth of detail in the 
Second Amended Complaint, it is impossible for Morton Grove to identify what the State claims 
Morton Grove, as opposed to the general "Defendants" did. Therefore, the District Court 
properly dismissed the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6). See 
e.g. Cook v. Zions First Natl Bank, 645 F. Supp. 423, 242 (D. Utah 1986) (finding that 
particularity in pleading fraud "is especially important in cases involving multiple defendants"). 
2. The State's "Feigned Ignorance" Argument Is Particularly 
Inapplicable to Morton Grove. 
A significant portion of the State's appeal is dedicated to the argument that Morton Grove 
should be able to determine the nature of the claims because of prior or concurrent litigation 
taking place outside of Utah. Specifically, the State argues that "with multiple lawsuits across 
the country arising from Defendants' conduct, they know precisely what the State's allegations 
entail and have ample notice of the claims against them." (Plaintiffs Brief at p. 17.) The State 
goes on to state that: 
Some of the earliest cases documenting Defendants' actions 
commenced nearly ten years ago. Defendants' various memoranda 
make it clear how familiar they are with the nature of the State's 
claim. Defendants' attempt to now "play dumb" regarding the 
State's claims insults the intelligence of anyone familiar with this 
case and seeks only to exploit a legal technicality. Despite 
Defendants' feigned ignorance, the Second Amended Complaint 
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provides sufficient notice of the claims against them and satisfies 
the appropriate pleading standard. 
(Id at p. 19) 
As an initial matter, none of the cases that the State cites to in support of its assertion that 
it need not properly plead its fraud claims involve fraud allegations. (Consol Realty Group v 
Sizzling Platter, Inc , 930 P.2d 268, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (lease dispute);) (Burr v Childs, 
265 P.2d 383 (Utah 1953) (wage recovery)). Plaintiffs have not and cannot cite to any decision 
that stands for the proposition that it is not required to plead its claims in conformity with the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 9(b) is not a "legal technicality," and Defendants are not 
"exploiting" it when they ask that the State abide by its own laws and rules. 
But even if this Court accepted the State's "legal technicality" argument, had the State 
looked at the dockets for these "other" cases, it would have seen that Morton Grove has not been 
a defendant or otherwise a party to any other "wholesale price" litigation. There is nothing in the 
record on appeal or elsewhere that supports the State's blanket contention that Morton Grove 
was a party to any other AWP pricing litigation. 
3. The State Has Failed to Adequately Plead That the State Used the 
Pricing Information Supplied by Morton Grove to Industry 
Reporting Services to Set the Reimbursement Rates. 
The State has failed to plead that the pricing information (either AWP, WAC, or other 
pricing information) supplied by Morton Grove, as opposed to the Defendants in general, 
affected Utah reimbursement rates, and therefore fails to state a claim against Morton Grove. 
Like most other states, Utah limits reimbursement rates for generic or multiple source 
drugs to the lower of either the Utah maximum allowable cost ("MAC"), the estimated 
acquisition cost ("EAC"), or the provider's usual and customary charge (billed charge) to the 
general public. See Utah State Medicaid Plan at Attachment 4.19-BError! Bookmark not 
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defined. ("Methods and Standards for Establishing Payment Rates - Other Types of Care"), p. 19 
(Pltf s Addendum at A0112). In addition, multiple source drug reimbursement rates, are limited, 
in the aggregate, by the FUL. See id. The FUL was, at the relevant times, 150% of the lowest 
reported public price by any manufacturer. See 42 C.F.R. 447.332(b). 
The State has not alleged that Morton Grove reported the lowest price which would have 
set the FUL. Nor has the State alleged that Utah used any pricing information (be it AWP, WAC 
and/or other pricing information) provided by Morton Grove to set the MAC, EAC, or any other 
reimbursement benchmark. Instead, the Second Amended Complaint only generally avers that 
"Utah Medicaid relied upon the AWP, WAC, and/or other pricing information provided by 
Defendants to the industry reporting services in determining the amount Utah Medicaid 
reimburses provider." (Second Amended Complaint at f 119.) (R. at 1139). This is clearly 
deficient. Simply put, the State has failed to allege how, let alone materially how, it relied on 
pricing information provided by Morton Grove to set reimbursement for drugs. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 26-20-2(3)(b) (requiring that the false representation be "material"); Dugan v. Jones, 615 
P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980). Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed the Second 
Amended Complaint. 
4. The Second Complaint Failed to Identify the Allegedly Fraudulent 
Pricing Information Relating to the Specific Pharmaceuticals Sold by 
Morton Grove, 
The State alleged that Morton Grove "made false publications for each drug identified in 
Exhibit A" (Second Amended Complaint at \ 49) (R. at 1126) - i.e., every single drug sold by 
Morton Grove within the State of Utah. The State did not, however, identify the allegedly 
fraudulent pricing information relating to any of the specific pharmaceuticals sold by Morton 
Grove. 
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The District Court rejected the State's argument that it need not plead these facts and 
stated it was "not convinced that the State is unable to obtain essential information regarding the 
defendants' pricing methods[,]" noting that the State had attached as an exhibit to its Complaint 
ua list with 'a few representative examples' of the specific instances where the State believps 
prices were inflated" and, based on representation made in its pleadings, that Utah was "currently 
in the process of conducting a comprehensive analysis which it predicts will yield the essential 
information." February 13, 2009 Memorandum Decision at p. 5. (R. at 1065.) The State's 
failure to plead this information - despite its representations to the Court that it was "conducting 
a comprehensive analysis" and the passage of a year between the filing of the Amended 
Complaint and its Second Amended Complaint - reveals its unwillingness to comply with the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In federal multi-district litigation considering a similar situation under the federal False 
Claims Act, the court held that the failure to specifically identify the fraudulent AWP and the 
"spread" provides a basis for a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). 
See In re Pharmaceutical Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig, 263 F. Supp. 2d 172, 194 (D. 
Mass. 2003) (holding that plaintiffs were required to clearly and concisely allege with respect to 
each defendant: (1) the specific drug or drugs that were purchased from defendant and (2) the 
allegedly fraudulent AWP for each drug). Other courts have required the same. See 
Commonwealth v. TAP Pharm. Prod., Inc., 868 A.2d 624, 635 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005); 
Massachusetts v. Mylan Labs, No. 03-11865-PBS (D. Mass. Apr. 5, 2005). The State failed to 
identify the allegedly fraudulent AWP and the actual price that Morton Grove should have 
reported; accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed the Second Amended Complaint. 
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5. The Second Amended Complaint Failed to Allege That Morton Grove 
Submitted Claims to the State or Directed Others to Submit Claims, 
and Failed to Identify Any Specific Facts Regarding the Marketing of 
the "Spread". 
The Second Amended Complaint failed to allege that Morton Grove submitted claims to 
Utah or directed others to submit claims to the State, instead making only the general statement 
that "the Defendants directed others to submit claims which led to false reimbursements." 
(Second Amended Complaint at \ 128.) With no allegations of specific instances where Morton 
Grove actually directed the submission of claims, the Second Amended Complaint failed to put 
Morton Grove on notice as to its alleged improper behavior and therefore failed to meet the 
requirements of Rule 9(b). 
In addition, the Second Amended Complaint lacked any specific allegations regarding the 
alleged marketing of the "spread." The Second Amended Complaint set forth no facts regarding 
how, when, or where Morton Grove, as opposed to the collective "Defendants," induced 
physicians and pharmacies to purchase Morton Grove drugs. Likewise, the Second Amended 
Complaint was devoid of allegations regarding Morton Grove's alleged persuasion of 
pharmacists and physicians that the larger "spread" on Morton Grove's drugs would allow the 
providers to receive more money. The Second Amended Complaint lacked any facts regarding 
Morton Grove's alleged provision of free goods, educational grants, and other incentives to 
induce providers to purchase its drugs. These are precisely the type of facts that the State would 
have to set forth in order state a claim. See In re Pharmaceutical Indus. Average Wholesale 
Price Litig, 491 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D. Mass. 2007) (specific instances of marketing the "spread" 
must be considered in making a determination as to whether unfair - not even fraudulent -
conduct exists); see also OIG Compliance Program for Pharma. Mfr., 68 Fed. Reg. 23, 731-01, 
23, 737 (May 5, 2003) (examples of "marketing the spread"). 
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Instead, the State's general allegations regarding the key issue of Defendants' marketing 
of their drugs (Second Amended Complaint at f 123) contained no specific facts as to Morton 
Grove. 
The Defendants' alleged marketing is a lynchpin of the Second, Amended Complaint. 
(Second Amended Complaint at *f 1, stating that "The Defendants' fraudulent pricing and 
marketing of their prescription drugs have impacted elderly, disabled and poor Utah citizens 
covered by the State's Medicaid program . . . by causing Utah Medicaid to pay grossly excessive 
prices for the Defendants' prescription drugs."). With no allegations of specific instances where 
Morton Grove actually marketed the "spread," or that Morton Grove marketed drugs within the 
State at all, the Second Amended Complaint failed to put Morton Grove on notice as to its 
alleged improper behavior. See In re Pharma. Indus, Average Wholesale Price Litig., 491 F. 
Supp. 2d at 102 (D. Mass. 2007). The State's failure to identify any specific instances of Morton 
Grove marketing was proper grounds for the District Court's dismissal of the Second Amended 
Complaint. See e.g. Cook supra, 645 F. Supp. at 242 (finding that particularity in pleading 
fraud "is especially important in cases involving multiple defendants"). 
6. The Second Complaint Failed to Allege Any Intent to Deceive By 
Morton Grove. 
The Utah False Claims Act requires false representations and an intent to deceive - i.e., 
fraud. See, e.g., §26-20-7(2)(c) ("a person may not. . . falsify or alter with intent to deceive, any 
report or document required by state or federal law, rule, or Medicaid provider agreement"). 
Also, Utah's claim of common law fraudulent misrepresentation requires proof of an intent to 
deceive. Dugan, 615 P.2d at 1246. 
The Complaint failed to set forth any factual allegations which would support a claim that 
Morton Grove acted with intent to deceive the State or any other individual or entity. Without 
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this allegation, the State cannot satisfy the requisite elements under either the Utah False Claims 
Act or fraudulent misrepresentation. Accordingly, the District Court correctly dismissed the 
Second Amended Complaint. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Morton Grove respectfully requests that this 
Honorable Court affirm the decision of the District Court. 
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